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Abstract 
Government health spending is an important source of sustainable health funding in order to attain the 
health-related Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In low and middle-income countries, domestic 
government per capita spending on health needed to ensure universal coverage with the most essential 
health services is estimated at $112 according to Stenberg et al. (2017). In 2015, in West Africa 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), average domestic government spending on health per 
capita was $26 (about one quarter of all health spending), far short of the $112 target. The purpose of 
this paper is to analyze the determinants of domestic government health spending with emphasis on the 
quality of governance. We used panel data from the eight WAEMU member states covering the period 
2000-2015 and the generalized least squares method for empirical investigation. The results show that 
an improvement in the quality of governance increases domestic government health spending. The 
study suggests the policy-makers of the WAEMU member state to improve the quality of governance in 
order to increase domestic government health spending and allow people to access essential health 
services and enjoy a better state of health. 
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1. Introduction 
Progress toward universal health care in developing countries require sustained increases in public 
spending on health. In these countries, an increase in domestic public financing of health spending is 
crucial for the sustainability of health programs and vital for improving the health of the population (Lu 
et al., 2010). Domestically financed government health spending can facilitate the accessibility of health 
care by the poor sections of the population, improve the quality of health care and increase the use of 
health services (Besstremyannaya, 2009; Dhoro, Chidoko, Sakuhuni, & Gwaindepi, 2011; Sirag, Nor, & 
Abdullah, 2017). To move towards universal health coverage, assessments have estimated the adequate 
amount of care needed by each state to guarantee a minimum package of health services to each citizen. 
In this sense, Stenberg et al. (2017) estimated that low-income countries must allocate to each person, 
through domestic public resources, an amount of 112 $US per capita per year to ensure a minimum 
package of care. This amount corresponds to 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) according to 
McIntyre, Meheus and Rottingen (2017). In addition to these benchmarks, African Heads of state 
pledged to Abuja in 2001 to allocate at least 15% of their yearly budgets to the health sector (African 
Union, 2001). 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) consists of eight countries: Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. They are struggling to meet these 
standards for allocating public resources to health sector. In 2015, world development indicators reveal 
that domestic government health spending per capita was 26 $US (World Bank, 2018a). These domestic 
government health spending equate 25% of health spending (compared to 27% in the year 2000) and 1.4% 
of GDP. Meanwhile, domestic government health spending in 2015 represented 35% of health spending 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and 59% in the world.  
Thus, domestic government health spending is insufficient to meet the growing health needs of 
communicable and non-communicable diseases. In 2015, according to health, nutrition and population 
data (World Bank, 2018b), more than half (57%) of deaths in WAEMU countries were caused by 
infectious diseases and maternity conditions compared with 33% for non-communicable diseases. The 
health personnel needed to provide adequate care to the WAEMU’s population according to WHO 
standards remain insufficient. In fact, the number of skilled workers per 10,000 inhabitants varies 
between 1.6 and 7.5. This is below the 44.5 agents per 10,000 inhabitants required to reach adequate 
coverage of primary health care interventions identified as primary for achieving health goals under the 
SDG 3 according to High-Level Commission on Health Employment and Economic Growth (2016). 
Similarly, in half of WAEMU member states (Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger and Togo), more than 50% of 
women continue to give birth without the assistance of qualified personnel. Moreover, in the WAEMU, 
access to quality essential health services remains problematic. Between 32% and 44% of these so-called 
essential services under universal health coverage are covered according to the World Health Statistics 
2018 (World Health Organization, 2018). These statistics indicate that access to health services remains 
low and less than half of the services deemed essential for the population are satisfied. 
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This shortage hinders the efforts of these countries to meet the minimum health care needs of their 
population, especially vulnerable groups. Therefore, it is important to study the determinants of public 
health spending whose understanding is essential for effective health policies (Dhoro, Chidoko, 
Sakuhuni, & Gwaindepi, 2011; Tandon, Fleisher, Li, & Yap, 2014; Braendle & Colombier, 2016). If the 
authors for so long have laid emphasis on economic variables (Newhouse, 1977), empirical assessments 
increasingly point out the crucial role played by the quality of governance in financing of government 
health spending (Besstremyannaya, 2009; Sirag, Nor, & Abdullah, 2017). However, the inadequacy of 
public spending on health accommodates a weak governance. In WAEMU, the average of each of the six 
dimensions of World Bank World governance indicators is negative over the period 2000-2015. This 
situation raises a question: What is the effect of the quality of governance on domestic government health 
spending in WAEMU? The objective of this study is to analyze the effect of the quality of governance on 
the level of domestic government health spending in WAEMU. To this end, we hypothesize that an 
improvement in the quality of governance favors an increase in domestic government health spending. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature. In section 3, the model, data and estimation technique are presented. Section 4 presents the 
summary statistics and discusses the empirical results. The last section summarizes the major findings of 
paper and gives some policy implications. 
 
2. Literature Review 
In this section, a review of theoretical literature and empirical work on the link between the quality of 
governance and health spending are discussed. 
2.1 Theoretical Framework  
What is the level of total government spending and how is it distributed among the different sectors of 
economy? According to Tandon, Fleisher, Li and Yap (2014), two theoretical approaches answer these 
interrogations: a normative approach and a positive approach.  
The normative approach analysis determines the optimal form of resource allocation in a country. This 
approach proceeds from a cost-benefit analysis. The government finances its expenses from revenues 
whose collection generates costs. As a result, public spending should be undertaken as long as the 
benefits from such spending exceed the costs of raising revenues for each sector. In terms of allocating 
resources across sectors, sectors should compete for the allocation of scarce resources up to the point 
where the marginal benefit of an additional resource unit of spending is equal across sectors. From this 
point of view, market failures (the presence of externalities, the public good nature of certain health 
interventions and the presence of extensive information asymmetries) and equity-related considerations 
in society are the main reasons for government intervention in the health sector (Musgrove, 1996; Jack, 
1999). However, if these arguments reasons prevail for health sector, they are equally applicable to other 
sectors including education. These arguments are therefore not enough to favor a budgetary arbitrage for 
the benefit of health sector. Thus, in a perspective of redefining government’s priorities, this theory 
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implies that health sector would need to demonstrate that the social benefits of additional public spending 
exceed the costs of financing this increase in spending. These costs include both the additional direct 
costs of generating additional revenue and the opportunity cost of relinquishing financing from other 
sectors. In this approach, the government is seen as a benevolent social planner who, by choosing the 
optimal level of health care, maximizes social well-being. Despite the logic behind this approach, it 
offers limited utility in understanding why some governments allocate more resources to the health 
sector than others. Indeed, the assumption that government would act on behalf of general interest is 
questioned by the theory of public choice whose pioneers are Buchanan and Tullock (1962). For these 
authors, individuals on the political arena (ruling elite) are not different from other individuals and are 
guided to make decisions in their own interest. In this perspective, the state is conceived as a mechanism 
through which three categories of institutional actors -the politician, the bureaucrat and the elector- 
guided by rationality, seek to maximize their personal utility and not the general interest. The interaction 
of the optimization behavior of the three actors results in the size and structure of public spending. The 
politician is motivated by the conquest and exercise of power in order to gain personal benefits associated 
with power exercise. His ultimate goal is to be elected, then re-elected and to keep on maximizing his 
gain. In doing so, he will maximize his chances of being elected or re-elected by adopting a strategy of 
exchanging, with targeted categories of voters, voting intentions in his favor against promises of state 
intervention in their favor. For his part, the elector chooses the politician he deems most likely to 
implement policies that will be favorable to him and less expensive in terms of taxes. As for the 
bureaucrat, he implements the decisions of political elites. But given the potential information benefits 
and the discretionary powers that he has, he is inclined to pursue his own goal. In this dynamic, his 
strategy is to obtain the highest budget for his office in order to maximize his utility function (upward 
mobility, revenue growth and responsibility), and take advantage of the information gap. This 
optimization is done under the conditions of the institutions and constraints set by the institutional 
framework in which the actors operate. 
The potential for rent creation varies with government sectors and the existence of private agendas at the 
state level to the detriment of the general interest creates distortions in the allocation of public spending 
(Hessami, 2014). The sectors conducive to corrupt transactions and for which the rent exists and can be 
easily extracted and concealed are prioritized. This is the case for sectors whose production of goods and 
services requires high technology and are offered in non-competitive markets (Mauro, 1998; Hessami, 
2014) . This prioritization is to the detriment of sectors such as education and health that offer fewer 
opportunities for rent-seeking, especially when institutions are weak and bad governance prevails 
(Mauro, 1998; Croix & Delavallade, 2007). 
Conversely, good governance favors the allocation of public spending to health in a context where health 
is a priority for population. In a context of good governance, the budget process leading to the allocation 
of public resources across sectors is transparent and participatory. Transparency and participation reduce 
information asymmetries and allow more equal access to information on budget spending between 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/rem               Research in Economics and Management               Vol. 5, No. 1, 2020 
5 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
citizens (taxpayers and voters) on the one hand, and politicians and bureaucrats on the other. As a result, 
opportunities for politicians and bureaucrats to serve narrow interest groups at the expense of the 
majority are diminishing. The search for rent is then minimized and the decisions taken by the authorities 
are in line with the priorities of the populations, thus favoring the general interest (Hooda, 2016). In these 
conditions, in a situation where the provision of quality health services is long-awaited by a large part of 
the population, as is the case of developing countries, governments will be more inclined to prioritize 
health sector in budget arbitrations. Thus, virtuous governance leads to an allocation of public spending 
in favor of health sector in countries where health problems are of concern to the population. 
2.2 Empirical Review 
Several studies have explored the relationship between the quality of governance and public resources 
allocated to health sector. These investigations cut across mixed samples, developed or developing 
countries exclusively and report divergent findings.  
In respect of mixed samples, Delavallade (2006) assessed the effect of corruption on the composition of 
government spending in a sample of 64 countries with data covering the period 1996-2001. Using three 
stage least squares method, the author showed that corruption reduces the share of social spending, such 
as education, health, and social protection, in total government spending. This conclusion is confirmed 
by Croix and Delavallade (2007) who, basing on a mixed samples of 63 countries, showed that 
corruption is unfavorable for public funding of human capital-generating sectors, including health. They 
argued that countries with high levels of corruption invest more in physical capital and housing, 
rent-generating sectors, and less in human capital such as health and education. Education and health 
sectors provide less rent-seeking opportunities for public servants and the government compared to other 
components of public spending (Mauro, 1998). In the same vein, Sirag et al. (2017) explored the 
determinants of public health spending in a sample of 177 developed and developing countries. They 
used dynamic panel data analysis and found that government effectiveness and corruption control are 
fundamental for the allocation of public spending to health sector. Liang and Mirelman (2014) examined 
the impact of socio-political factors on government health financing in 120 developed and developing 
countries from 1995 to 2010. By applying a fixed-effects two-stage least squares regression method, they 
suggested that democratic accountability has a diminishing positive correlation with government health 
spending, and that levels of government health spending are higher when government is more stable. 
They found in addition that corruption is associated with less government health spending in developing 
countries, but with higher government health spending in developed countries. The importance of good 
governance for health budgeting is confirmed by Farag et al. (2012). In investigating a sample of 173 
countries over the period 1995-2006, they reported that voice and accountability has a significant 
positive influence on mobilizing more resources for health.  
The link between the quality of governance and public health spending has been the subject of empirical 
investigations in developed countries. In this context, Baraldi (2008) and Jajkowicz and Drobiszová 
(2015) have respectively shown in a sample of 20 Italian regions and 21 member state of the OECD that 
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corruption reduces the share of public spending devoted to education and health sectors in favor of other 
sectors such as general services. This result is confirmed by the work of Liu and Mikesell (2014) who, 
using microeconomic data of the United States covering the period 1997-2008, showed that the most 
corrupted states allocate a tiny proportion of the budget to health, hospitals and well-being. In 
investigating empirically a sample of 18 OECD member states, Potrafke (2010) found that politicians act 
opportunely by increasing public spending on health during the election years. Because health system is 
a particularly sensitive issue for voters, politicians in power can increase their popularity and therefore 
their chances of being re-elected by additional spending in the health field. In a case study, 
Besstremyannaya (2009) examined the Russian health system and suggested that institutional 
inefficiencies are a major handicap to improving and sustaining the funding of public health programs. 
While the above studies highlight a positive link between the quality of governance and the level of 
public health spending, others relativize its role. In this wave, Hessami (2014), basing on data of 29 
OECD member states over the period 1996-2009, concluded that a higher level of corruption is 
associated with an increase in the share of spending on health and environmental protection. For this 
author, this counterintuitive result can be explained by the preponderance of high-technology equipment 
in health sector. In most cases, this equipment is supplied in an oligopolistic and sometimes monopolistic 
market. This market situation makes the price of these equipments less transparent because they are 
known only by specialists, hence the existence of a high rent that is easily concealable. In view of these 
characteristics, political leaders and officials are tempted to increase the share of the budget devoted to 
health in order to derive associated rents. Conducting investigations into the United State case, Cordis 
(2014) reinforces Hessami’s conclusion. His study found that a high level of corruption, rather than a 
reduction, increases the share of public health spending. This finding is also the conclusion reached by 
Lagravinese and Paradiso (2014). In a case study of 21 administrative jurisdictions in Italy over the 
period 1998-2008, the authors revealed that corruption increases public spending on health, including 
pharmaceutical spending and private hospital spending. 
Several studies have been conducted to look into the effect of the quality of governance on public health 
spending in developing countries. Hashem (2014), in a study based on a sample of 13 Arab countries over 
the period 1998-2008, found that corruption appears to modify the structure of public spending in favor 
of defense and energy at the expense of social sectors like education and health. The author argues that 
public spending on health and education curbs down as the level of corruption increases. In the same vein, 
Gibson (2018) examines the determinants of public health spending in the Arab League member states 
between 1996 and 2014. He shows that the effectiveness of government has a positive influence on 
public health spending. 
In the case of Africa, Fosu (2008), using five-year averages data of 35 sub-Saharan African countries 
over the period 1975-1994, concluded that the improvement of the quality of governance, approximated 
by constraint on the government executive, tends to shift the budget in favor of health sector. Similarly, 
Mathonnat (2010), using data covering 46 sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1998-2004, 
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showed, after an econometric estimation by the fixed effects method, that corruption exerts a significant 
negative influence on budgetary trade-offs in favor of health sector. He revealed that public health 
spending as a percentage of total public spending or in dollars per capita falls with the level of corruption. 
Ramashamole and Thamae (2015) confirm this result from a case study on Lesotho. Using data covering 
the period 1980-2011 and the fully modified least squares method, the authors found that political 
instability is negatively associated with public health spending. These results are in line with those 
obtained by Kumah and Brazys (2016) in an empirical evaluation of a sample of 46 to 48 African 
countries. They established that public accountability, approximated by the presence of political 
opposition and or civil society, transparency and independence of the judiciary, favors an increase in 
public health spending in relation to GDP. 
In contrast to the studies listed above, another strand of the literature has failed to show a significant 
relationship between the quality of governance and public health spending in developing countries. 
Imoughele and Ismaila (2013), estimating an error-correction model from Nigeria’s data covering the 
period 1986-2010, revealed that political instability has no significant influence on public health 
resources. This result was reinforced by that of Olawunmi (2014) who found that political instability 
does not have a statistically significant impact on public spending allocated to the health sector in Nigeria 
between 1990 and 2012.  
In sum, these empirical work revealed contrasting results about the effect of the quality of governance on 
public health spending. This overview of the empirical literature has also revealed that empirical 
evaluations of WAEMU member states are limited. However, the state of governance in these countries 
is not rosy and the level of public health spending in the countries remains low, despite the efforts made. 
Similarly, domestic public health spending, even if it is not a sufficient condition, is still necessary to 
improve the health status of populations, since the provision of health care be it preventive or curative 
implies a cost. This situation, coupled with the controversial empirical literature and weaknesses of the 
health systems in WAEMU member states, legitimizes an empirical assessment of the effect of the 
quality of governance on fiscal arbitrage in favor of the health sector. This assessment requires the 
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3. Model, Data and Estimation Technique 
3.1 Model Specification and Choice of Variables 
3.1.1 Model Specification 
Our empirical approach is based on public health spending determinants models developed in Africa and 
developing countries by Murthy and Okunade (2009), Farag et al. (2012) and Imoughele and Ismaila 
(2013). To examine the effect of the quality of governance on domestic public health spending in 
WAEMU member state, we propose a panel data log-log specification in which coefficients are 
interpreted as elasticities as follows: 
ܔܗ܏	 ۲۵۶܁ܑܜ ൌ ઺ܗ ൅ ઺૚ܔܗ܏	۵ܗܞ ൅ ઺૛ܔܗ܏۵۲۾ܑܜ ൅ ઺૜ܔܗ܏۵۶ۯ࢏࢚ ൅ ࢼ૝࢒࢕ࢍࡲ࡯࢏࢚ ൅ ࢼ૞࢒࢕ࢍࢀ࡮ࡵ࢏࢚ ൅
ࢼ૟࢒࢕ࢍࡰࡼ࢏࢚ ൅ ࢿ࢏࢚	ሺ૚ሻ where 
۲۵۶܁	stands for domestic government health spending per capita in $US in PPP 
۵ܗܞ represents the quality of governance indicator 
۵۲۾	means gross domestic product per capita in $US in PPP 
۵۶ۯ is health assistance spending transiting trough government  
۴۱ equals fiscal capacity; 
܂۰۷ refers to tuberculosis incidence 
۲۾ is the proportion of dependent population  
ઽܑܜ is the error term; ܑ represents the country and ܜ	the period. 
3.1.2 Choice of Variables  
The dependent variable is domestic public health spending per capita. It is used to capture the state efforts 
in investing for the health of the population. Under universal health coverage, a minimum package of 
healthcare equivalent to 112 $US per capita per year is required in low-income countries (Stenberg et al., 
2017). This indicator is a better measure of the priority that health authorities place on health in relation 
to the share of the state budget allocated to the sector, as the allocated budget can increase while per 
capita spending decreases (Mathonnat, 2010).  
The explanatory variables are the quality of governance, the income, the development assistance for 
health sector, a demographic factor, the fiscal capacity and the epidemiological profile. 
 The Quality of Governance 
The operational definition of governance used for the empirical analysis is that of the World Bank 
proposed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999). For these authors, governance consists of “the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised”. This definition includes the 
process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. The methodology for constructing 
the world governance indicators of the World Bank has been criticized in the literature in different 
aspects. It does not allow comparisons over time and between countries, the lack of theoretical 
underpinnings and the aggregation process (Thomas, 2010; Fukuyama, 2016). Despite these criticisms, 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/rem               Research in Economics and Management               Vol. 5, No. 1, 2020 
9 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
the indicators are widely used in the empirical literature. The six broad dimensions of governance taken 
into account are: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and corruption control. Each measure ranges 
from -2.5 (weak governance) to +2.5 (strong governance) and a higher score indicates a better rating. 
Each of the six indicators measures a particular aspect of the quality of governance and does not capture 
the other dimensions. However, governance is a multidimensional concept and the use of one dimension 
does not make it possible to define the whole concept (Fukuyama, 2016). Using one indicator while 
ignoring others may lead to omitted variables bias (Keho, 2012). Besides, the use of all these indicators in 
an econometric equation can lead to multicollinearity problems because these variables may be highly 
correlated. To deal with these econometric problems, we conduct Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 
to determine whether these indicators can be measured by a synthetic indicator. PCA is a multivariate 
analysis technique, which transforms original measured data into new uncorrelated variables called 
principal components. 
The use of PCA requires the factorability of the initial variables that is the heterogeneity of data. This 
condition can be verified in three ways: correlation analysis, Bartlett’s test of sphericity and 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) index.When initial variables are strongly correlated or the correlation 
matrix determinant is sufficiently weak, the use of PCA is fully justified. Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
consists in checking the extent to which the correlation matrix diverges significantly from the identity 
matrix. Taking the form of a chi 2, it tests the null hypothesis that the matrix of correlations is an identity 
matrix and that there is no relationship between the variables. The null hypothesis rejection indicates the 
existence of correlation between the variables and bases the relevance of the PCA. As far as KMO index 
is concerned, it indicates the degree of influence of the other variables on the correlation between two 
variables. It indicates to what extent the chosen set of variables is a coherent set and makes it possible to 
constitute one or more adequate measures of a given concept.  
The correlation analysis shows that all the six variables are correlated at 1% level. Similarly, the 
determinant of correlation matrix is very small (0.002), confirming the strong correlation between 
variables and justifying the construction of governance single index. In addition, the p-value associated 
with Bartlett’s sphericity test is 0.000. The alternative hypothesis of correlation between variables is 
therefore accepted, indicating that the data lend themselves to the PCA. In addition, the KMO index 
stood at 0.848 indicating the adequacy of the PCA. These different tests confirm the heterogeneity of the 
data and establish the relevance of PCA use.  
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Table 1. Principal Component Analysis Results 
Principal component 1 2 3 4 5 6 
corruption control  0.418 -0.347 0.392 0.322 -0.571 0.347 
gouvernement  effectiveness 0.430 -0.183 -0.419 0.603 0.209 -0.444 
political stability 0.293 0.832 0.369 0.265 0.115 0.007 
regulatory quality 0.425 -0.309 0.320 -0.257 0.710 0.222 
rule of law 0.446 0.032 0.095 -0.574 -0.316 -0.600 
voice and accountability 0.416 0.233 -0.649 -0.254 -0.110 0.521 
Eigenvalues 4.491 0.801 0.326 0.165 0.120 0.943 
% of variance 74.85 13.36 5.45 2.76 2.01 1.57 
Cumulative %  74.85 88.82 93.66 96.42 98.43 100 
Source: Computed by authors from the World development indicators (World Bank, 2018a). 
 
From this Table, it appears that the first principal component alone explains 74.85% of the total variance 
and the information from the original variables. Following the Kaiser criterion, it is used for the 
determination of the single index, obtained by making a linear combination of the six dimensions of 
governance, each of which is weighted. 
The index has been rescaled to assume values between 1 and 6, allowing the use of logarithm. This 
rescaling of the governance indicators for practical needs is often meet in the literature notably in the 
works of Keho (2012), McGuire (2013) and Karyani et al. (2015). 
 The Income 
The empirical literature on the link between per capita income level and public health spending has 
revealed a positive relationship between these two variables. This positive link is obtained not only in the 
case of mixed panels (Fan & Savedoff, 2014; Sirag, Nor, & Abdullah, 2017), but also in empirical 
evaluations applied to developed countries (Bose, 2015) as well as in cases studies of developing 
countries (Farag et al., 2012). In addition to the positive effect of per capita income, the above mentioned 
studies state that health is a necessity good. In line with this empirical literature, GDP per capita in $US 
in Parity Purchasing Power (PPP) is taken into account as a control variable. A positive coefficient is 
expected, reflecting the idea that the more a country is developed, the more it allocates resources to the 
health sector. 
 The Development Assistance for Health Sector  
Most donor countries of official development assistance, by targeting the health sector, implicitly or 
sometimes explicitly wish to increase public health spending. In doing so, they want beneficiary 
governments to maintain their level of health spending by receiving the aid (Dieleman & Hanlon, 2014). 
However, given the multiplicity of recipient governments’ priorities, the aid can often crowd out public 
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health spending. In this case, by loosening the fiscal constraint, aid can encourage recipient countries to 
reallocate domestic resources among other sectors. 
Empirical literature on the link between development assistance for health sector and public health 
spending has provided controversial results. Some authors have highlighted a substitution effect between 
domestic public health spending and health aid (Xu, Saksena, & Holly, 2011; Dieleman & Hanlon, 2014), 
while other studies have found that development assistance for health has a positive effect on public 
health spending (Dhoro, Chidoko, Sakuhuni, & Gwaindepi, 2011).  
In the context of support for the financing of the health sector in developing countries by developed 
countries, the latter are dealing with several actors. They support the governments of developing 
countries directly, but they often go through non-governmental organizations. In this work, aid to health 
is approximated by development assistance granted to health and transiting through the government as a 
percentage of total development assistance for health. During the period 2000-2015, this aid through the 
Union’s governments accounted for 76% of development assistance for health. In view of the priority of 
the health sector for populations revealed by the 2014/2015 Afrobarometer survey and the difficulties 
encountered by the countries of the Union in complying with the benchmark for domestic financing of 
health through public resources, we hypothesized a positive association between government health 
spending and development assistance for health. 
 The Demographic Factors 
Demographic factors play an important role in the growth of health spending. Indeed, vulnerable strata of 
society such as children and old people need more health care. As a result, the higher the proportion of 
these people, the more public spending is needed to meet their needs. In this study, the proportion of 
adults over 65 years and children under 15 years is selected to represent the effects of demographic 
factors on domestic government health spending, which is also expected to be positive.  
 The Fiscal Capacity 
In the empirical literature on the determinants of public health spending, fiscal capacity is considered as a 
relevant variable. It is often measured by public spending as a proportion of GDP (Xu, Saksena, & Holly, 
2011; Fan & Savedoff, 2014) or public spending as a percentage of GDP, excluding health spending 
(Dieleman & Hanlon, 2014). However, the approximation of fiscal capacity by public spending as a 
proportion of GDP is questioned by some authors such as Hooda (2016). This author estimates that a 
country’s ability to generate resources through revenues is more appropriate for measuring its fiscal 
capacity. In line with Hooda (2016), fiscal capacity in WAEMU member states is measured by public 
revenue as a share of the GDP. These revenues consist of direct taxes on income and profits, indirect 
taxes, taxes on foreign trade and other taxes, non-tax revenues and natural resource rents. Fiscal capacity 
is expected to have a positive effect on domestic public health spending in WAEMU. 
 The Epidemiological Profile 
The epidemiological profile is often included as a covariate in health spending regressions. A sick 
population needs more health care which requires more resources. Several indicators reflecting the 
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epidemiological profile have been used in the empirical literature. Commonly used indicators are the 
prevalence rate of HIV-AIDS (Lu et al., 2010), the incidence of tuberculosis (Xu, Saksena, & Holly, 
2011; Sirag, Nor, & Abdullah, 2017), the maternal mortality rate (Murthy & Okunade, 2009) and the 
under-five mortality rate (Hooda, 2016). Empirical results reveal that these variables are generally 
insignificant to account for government health spending (Murthy & Okunade, 2009; Lu et al., 2010; Xu, 
Saksena, & Holly, 2011; Hooda, 2016; Sirag, Nor, & Abdullah, 2017). 
In most WAEMU member states, with an average incidence rate per 1,000 people at risk of 276.67 in 
2015 according to health, nutrition and population statistics (World Bank, 2018b), malaria is one of 
deadliest diseases. In 2017, for example, the statistics revealed that malaria was the first cause of death in 
three countries (Burkina Faso, Niger and Togo), the second cause of death in two countries (Benin and 
Mali) and the 4th and 8th cause of death respectively in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. Given this situation, 
malaria incidence rate appears to be the best indicator to capture the epidemiological profile in WAEMU. 
However, existing data only partially cover the selected study period. Thus, in the absence of data on 
malaria, the epidemiological profile is approximated by the incidence of tuberculosis. It measures the 
estimated number of new cases and relapse of tuberculosis in a given year, expressed per 100,000 
inhabitants. In 2015, the average incidence rate of tuberculosis was 122.25 per 100,000 inhabitants. 
Tuberculosis is a communicable disease that was among the top ten causes of death, all ages combined in 
2017 in seven of the eight WAEMU member states. Similarly, tuberculosis is one of the diseases to be 
addressed by the 2030s under the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). As the incidence of 
tuberculosis is considered to be a factor in increasing health spending, a positive relationship is expected 
between this variable and domestic public health spending. 
3.2 Source of Data and Method of Analysis 
3.2.1 Source of Data  
The empirical investigation uses annual time series data covering the period 2000-2015 for the eight 
WAEMU member states. The choice of this period is explained by the availability of data on domestic 
government health spending. 
The data used for the econometric evaluation derive from several sources. Domestic government health 
spending, health aid, the proportion of dependent population and the incidence of tuberculosis are taken 
from health, nutrition and population database of World Bank (2018b). GDP per capita and the quality of 
governance are from world development indicators database of World Bank (2018a). Countries’ fiscal 
capacity is obtained from African economic outlook of African Development Bank (2017). 
3.2.2 Analysis Method 
In this study, the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator with specific controls for error term 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity is used for empirical investigation. Generally, in stationary panels, 
Hausman test allows to choose between the two principles approaches applying in the modeling of panel 
data (fixed effects or random effects models), the most appropriate estimator. However, according to 
Greene (2012), failure to account for heterogeneity even when the fixed effects model is appropriate 
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makes Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimator inconsistent. Likewise, in the case of the random effects 
model, although the ordinary least square estimator may be consistent, it tends to underestimate its true 
variance. The GLS estimator is efficient whereas the OLS estimator is not. In addition, in the event of 
autocorrelation of errors and heteroscedasticity, the OLS estimators obtained by the method are unbiased 
but are not at minimum variance (Bourbonnais, 2015). Under these conditions, the unbiased linear 
estimator of minimum variance is GLS estimator, also called the Aitken estimator (Gujarati, 2004; 
Bourbonnais, 2015). Similarly, the OLS estimator, whether corrected for heteroscedasticity or not, 
consistently overestimates standard deviations obtained from GLS, a most robust estimator. With OLS 
estimator, a coefficient can be declared statistically insignificant even though in fact (based on the more 
robust GLS estimator) it may be (Gujarati, 2004).  
 
4. Empirical Results  
Empirical results and discussion will be presented in two stages. As a first step, unit root tests are 
performed to determine the order of integration of the variables. The model validity is also tested through 
the Wald test. In a second step, the empirical results from the estimates are presented and discussed. But 
before that, it seems appropriate to present the main descriptive statistics of the variables. 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 below summarizes some descriptive statistics of the variables used over the period 2000-2015.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Observations Average Standard 
déviation 
Minimum Maximum
Domestic government health 
spending per capita ($ US in 
PPP) 
128 20.265 8.624 4.567 41.382 
Gouvernance WGI 128 -1.342 0.721 -2.468 0.113 
GDP per capita  
($US in PPP) 
128 1552.174 583.050 597.19 3451.88 
Government Health Aid (% 
of total health aid) 
128 76.123 20.019 15.831 99.364 
Fiscal Capacity  
(Public revenue in % of 
GDP) 
127 15.225 3.431 7.578 23.190 
Tuberculosis Incidence (per 
100.000 inhabitants) 
128 142.390 104.161 52 387 
Dependent Population (% of 
totale population) 
128 47.879 2.111 44.570 52.755 
Source: Authors’ computation from data. 
 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/rem               Research in Economics and Management               Vol. 5, No. 1, 2020 
14 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
These statistics suggest an average score of the synthetic quality of governance indicator of -1.34 on a 
scale of -2.5 to 2.5, with -2.5 reflecting poor quality governance and 2.5 better governance. The state of 
governance is weak in the Union during the period under review. 
Domestic government health spending per capita PPP ranged from 8.62 $US to 41.36 $US, with an 
average of US $ 20.26. During the period 2000-2015, public aid to health through the Union’s 
governments accounted for 76% of the aid granted to the sector. Over the period 2000-2015, average 
GDP per capita in WAEMU member states was 1552.17 $US in PPP and government revenue 
averaged 15.22% of GDP. 
The incidence of tuberculosis per 100,000 inhabitants of WAEMU averaged 142 during the same 
period. The most vulnerable people to the disease, composed of young people (aged 15) and old people 
(over 65) accounted for 47.87% of the total population over the period 2000-2015. 
4.2 Variables Stationarity Test and Validity of the Model 
4.2.1 Unit Root Tests 
The tests of Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2002) are used to verify the stationarity of variables. 
Table 3 below summarizes the results of stationarity tests carried out.  
 
Table 3. Results from Unit Root Tests 
 
Variables 
Level First Difference  Conclu
sion MW Choi MW Choi 
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Note. Figures in parenthesis are p-value. ***, ** and * denotes the stationarity at 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
Source: Authors computation. 
 
I (0) and I (1) mean that the variable is stationary at level and at first difference respectively.  
The stationarity result of the variables of the model gives the same conclusions as well with the test of 
Maddala and Wu (1999) than with that of Choi (2002). Apart from the per capita GDP which is stationary 
in first difference (integrated of order 1), the other variables are stationary at level. Since GDP per capita 
is integrated of order 1, its first difference will be considered in the estimates. 
4.2.2 Wald Test 
The Wald test is a test of overall significance of the coefficients. The null hypothesis considers a joint 
nullity of the coefficients. The results of this test are provided in the last row of Table 4 below. Since the 
p-value is less than 1%, the null hypothesis is rejected, indicating that the parameters are not jointly null. 
As a result, the model is adequate. 
4.3 Presentation and Discussion of Empirical Results 
4.3.1 Baseline Estimate Results 
The results of baseline models are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Baseline Results  
 Dependent Variable: logarithm of Domestic 
Government Health Spending 
per Capita 
logarithm of Domestic 
Government Health Spending 
as a share of GDP 


















log(Tuberculosis Incidence) 0.405*** 0.406*** 
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(0.000) (0.000) 








Number of Countries 8 8 
Prob > CHI2 0.000 0.000 
Note. Figures in parentheses are p-values.  
***, ** and *denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Source: Authors’ Estimation. 
 
The estimation reveals that the coefficient associated with the governance indicator is positive and 
significant at 1% level. An improvement in the quality of governance, reflected in an increase in the 
composite indicator of 1% contributes, all things being equal, to an increase in domestic public health 
spending per person of 0.21%. The positive effect of the quality of governance improvement on domestic 
public health spending remains valid if domestic public health spending as a share of GDP is used as an 
alternative dependent variable instead of domestic public health spending per capita. This result is 
theoretically expected. In a context of virtuous governance, resource allocation decisions are based on 
people’s concerns and priorities (Hooda, 2016). Health problems are one of the major concerns of the 
population and additional investment in health is a priority according to the Afrobarometer survey 
conducted in 2015 in WAEMU member states (Armah-Attoh, Selormey, & Houessou, 2016). In these 
conditions, an improvement in the quality of governance results in an increase in public health spending.  
The result from this study is consistent with the previous studies, which showed that more corruption 
penalizes government health spending (Delavallade, 2006; Croix & Delavallade, 2007; Baraldi, 2008; 
Mathonnat, 2010; Hashem, 2014; Jajkowicz & Drobiszová, 2015). Similarly, the result is in line with the 
authors who found that government effectiveness, political stability and constraint on government 
increase public health spending (Fosu, 2008; Ramashamole & Thamae, 2015; Sirag, Nor, & Abdullah, 
2017). In the same vein, the result consolidates that of the authors who have shown that voice and 
accountability are conducive to increasing public health spending by domestic resources (Farag et al., 
2012). 
However, our study infirmed the conclusion from previous studies that public health spending increases 
with poor governance, including a high level of corruption, particularly in developed countries (Cordis, 
2014; Hessami, 2014). Moreover, it challenges the authors’ findings that governance factors have no 
statistically significant effect on public health spending (Imoughele & Ismaila, 2013; Olawunmi, 2014). 
Most control variables have the expected signs. GDP per capita has a positive coefficient equal to 0.32 
and is significant at the 1% level, meaning that GDP increases led to increased government health 
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spending. All other things being equal, an increase in per capita GDP by 1% is associated with 0.32% in 
government health spending per capita. This result reflects the fact that the more countries develop, the 
more they are able to allocate more resources to health. In 2015 for example, according to world 
development indicators (World Bank, 2018a), high-income countries had public health spending per 
capita of 3.370 $US in parity purchasing power compared with 20 $US in parity purchasing power for 
low-income country. In addition, the empirical result indicates that income elasticity of government 
health spending is less than one, suggesting that public provision of health care in WAEMU is considered 
as a necessity. This result is in line with those obtained in panel studies of developing countries led by 
Farag et al. (2012) and Zimbabwe’s case by Dhoro et al. (2011). 
External funds for health that passe through the government has a positive and significant coefficient at 
the 10% level, suggesting a complementary with public health spending in WAEMU member states. In 
WAEMU, despite the plurality of priorities, this assistance complements domestic resources to finance 
health systems. This result consolidates the conclusion of Dhoro et al. (2011) about the complementarity 
between external fund for health and government health spending in Zimbabwe. However, it contrasts 
with that obtained by Lu et al. (2010) who found that in developing countries, health assistance reduces 
government health spending. 
Fiscal capacity coefficient is positive and significant at 1% level supporting the view that the level of 
government health spending increase with the improvement of fiscal capacity. An increase in public 
revenue as a proportion of GDP of 1% induces, ceteris paribus, increase in public health spending per 
capita of 0.48%. This result is in line with theoretical expectations and corroborates evidence from the 
health determinant literature in which the same indicator is used to approximate fiscal capacity in 
sub-Saharan Africa and Indian states (Mathonnat, 2010; Hooda, 2016). 
Results also indicates that the incidence of tuberculosis increases public domestic health spending. Its 
coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level. An increase in the incidence of the disease by 1% 
leads, all things being equal, to an increase in public health spending per capita of 0.40%. This result is in 
line with the idea that more resources are needed to support a sick population. In particular, the treatment 
of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis is the responsibility of the government with regard to the 
negative externalities that these can generate through the contagion of a healthy person by a patient. In 
this respect, the larger the population is affected, the more the state injects resources to limit contagion.  
The proportion of dependent population has no significant effect on domestic public health spending. 
This vulnerable group constitutes almost half of WAEMU’s population. As a result, it was expected that 
an increase in this population would be an increase factor of government health spending. This result is 
therefore out of step with the theoretical expectations. The explanation that can be given is that little 
attention has been paid to the budget allocation to this part of the population during the period under 
review. The result is consistent with the findings that in developing countries, population structure has no 
influence on public health spending (Fosu, 2008; Sirag, Nor, & Abdullah, 2017). 
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4.3.2 Robustness Checks 
In this subsection, we conducted additional analyzes to confirm the robustness of our findings in baseline 
model by using alternatives measures of governance quality. We constructed two synthetic governance 
indicators from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) databases. We use PCA method to build an ICRG synthetic indicator with six 
governance dimensions: quality of bureaucracy, corruption, rule of law, democratic accountability, 
investment profile and government stability. In the estimate that takes this variable into account, if the 
period 2000-2015 was respected, the sample is composed of 7 countries, excluding Benin for lack of data. 
We also use CPIA public sector management and institutions’ component to conceive a composite 
indicator in order to test the robustness of baseline result. The public sector management and institutions 
cluster includes property rights and rule-based governance, quality of budgetary and financial 
management, efficiency of revenue mobilization, quality of public administration and transparency, 
accountability and corruption in the public sector. Data on these variables are available over the period 
2005-2015. Data covering the eight countries of the Union for this period are used for the robustness test.  
The results of the estimates are shown in Table 5 below.  
 
Table 5. Robustness Checks with ICRG and CPIA Synthetic Governance Indicators 
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Government Domestic Health Spending per Capita 
log (ICRG Single Index) 0.256*** 
(0.000) 
 
log(CPIA single Index)  0.937*** 
(0.000) 
























Number of countries 7 8 
Prob > CHI2 0.000 0.000 
Note. Figures in parentheses are p-values are in parentheses. 
***, ** and *denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Source: Authors’ Estimation. 
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The coefficients of composite governance indicators of ICRG and CPIA are both positive and significant 
at 1% level. These results mean that an improvement in the quality of governance contributes to an 




Domestic government health spending, despite an increase during the period 2000-2015 in West Africa 
Economic and Monetary Union, remains low to ensure the minimum healthcare for the entire population. 
Similarly, the quality of governance is low. On the basis of these observations, this article aimed to 
evaluate the effect of the quality of governance on domestic public health spending. Using generalized 
least squares estimator, the results show that a better quality of governance increases domestic 
government health spending. In addition to governance quality, external funds for health transiting 
through governments, GDP per capita, fiscal capacity and the incidence of tuberculosis are the most 
determinants of domestic government health spending. Our research reveals that healthcare far from 
being a luxury good in the Union, is a necessity good. The proportion of the dependent population has no 
effect on domestic public health spending. 
In terms of policy implication, our study suggests the policy-makers of the WAEMU member states to 
improve the quality of governance in order to increase government health spending and allow people to 
have access to better healthcare and enjoy a better state of health. 
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